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THE HOLMES SCHOOL OF LAW: A 
PROPOSAL TO REFORM LEGAL 
EDUCATION THROUGH REALISM 
ROBERT RUBINSON* 
Abstract: This article proposes the formation of a new law school, the Holmes 
School of Law. The curriculum of the Holmes School would draw upon legal 
realism, particularly as articulated by Oliver Wendell Holmes. The proposed 
curriculum would focus on educating students about “law in fact”—how law is 
actually experienced. It rejects the idea that legal education should be about 
reading cases written by judges who not only bring their own biases and cultural 
understandings to their role, but who also ignore law as experienced, which, in 
the end, is what law is. This disconnect is especially troubling because virtually 
all legal education ignores law as experienced by low-income people. The arti-
cle concludes with responses to anticipated objections to the proposal. 
I. MISSION STATEMENT 
The mission of a newly established Holmes School of Law is to teach 
law.1 
II. COURSE DESCRIPTIONS: A SELECTION2 
Adjudication: 8 Credits 
An examination of different fora where matters are adjudicated. Students 
will observe where the bulk of adjudication takes place, including the Two 
Minute Hearing Court to Evict Tenants;3 the Default Judgment Foreclosure 
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 * Dean Gilbert A. Holmes Professor of Clinical Theory & Practice, Director of Clinical Edu-
cation, University of Baltimore Law School. The author acknowledges the receipt of a University 
of Baltimore Summer Research Fellowship, which facilitated the completion of this article. The 
author is grateful to Michele E. Gilman for her suggestions and insights, and to Lauren Vint for 
her research assistance. The author also would like to acknowledge Anthony G. Amsterdam, 
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 1 Like other mission statements, this Mission Statement says nothing. It does, however, have 
the virtue of brevity. 
 2 The Proposal holds that breaking down a law school curriculum into “subjects” that have 
purported independence is misleading and a simplification because law is really all about context 
and interactions. See infra notes 61–70 and accompanying text. 
 3 Consider the degree of process accorded defendants in “Rent” and “Housing” courts of 
major U.S. cities. On a typical day at Boston’s Housing Court in 2002, 141 of 208 cases on the 
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Court and the “processes” it employs;4 Administrative Court for Prolonged 
and Fruitless Review of Unjustified Denials of Government Benefits;5 the 
Court for Incarceration through Plea Bargains and Sham Waivers of a Consti-
tutional “Right” to a Jury Trial;6 judicial process “adjudicating” the welfare of 
                                                                                                                           
docket were set for trial. Trina Drake Zimmerman, Representation in ADR and Access to Justice 
for Legal Services Clients, 10 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 181, 195 (2003). In these trials, 
“landlords were represented in 111 cases, [while] tenants were represented in thirteen cases . . . .” 
Id. Cook County courts handle about 40,000 eviction cases per year, in which only about ten per-
cent of tenants are represented. Id. at 192; see Karen Doran et al., No Time for Justice: A Study of 
Chicago’s Eviction Court, LAWYERS’ COMM. FOR BETTER HOUS., 11 (Dec. 2003), http://lcbh.
org/sites/default/files/resources/2003-lcbh-chicago-eviction-court-study.pdf (noting that the aver-
age eviction case lasts only one minute and forty-four seconds). A typical day in Baltimore’s “rent 
court” includes a docket of 1050 cases. A System in Collapse: Baltimore City Suffers from an 
Overwhelmingly High Caseload of Tenant Evictions. Hurt in the Process Are Tenants, Landlords, 
and the City of Baltimore and Its Neighborhoods, ABELL REP. (Abell Found., Baltimore, Md.), 
Mar. 2003, at 2. Cases in New York City’s Housing Court are “disposed of at an average rate of 
five to fourteen minutes per case, with many settlements in the range of five minutes or less.” 144 
Woodruff Corp. v. Lacrete, 585 N.Y.S.2d 956, 960 (Civ. Ct. 1992); see Jonathan L. Hafetz, Al-
most Homeless, LEGAL AFF., July–Aug. 2002, 11, 12 (noting that more than 300,000 cases are 
filed in New York City housing courts each year, with each judge, on average, hearing 7000 cases 
per year). The case of Williams v. Housing Authority addresses the illusory nature of such 
“courts.” 760 A.2d 697, 703–04 (Md. 2000) (finding that a so-called “Rent Court” is an adminis-
trative fiction which, despite its geographic separation from other courts, has no distinct legal 
status or jurisdictional limitation). 
 4 See Ariana Eunjing Cha & Brady Dennis, Amid Mountain of Paperwork, Shortcuts and For-
geries Mar Foreclosure Process, WASH. POST, Sept. 23, 2010, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/09/22/AR2010092206132.html (“The nation’s overburdened foreclosure 
system is riddled with faked documents, forged signatures and lenders who take shortcuts reviewing 
borrower’s files . . . .”). A well-publicized example of this “process” is the prevalence of “robo-
signing” through which court papers are filed without individualized review by the mortgagee. An-
drea J. Boyack, Community Collateral Damage: A Question of Priorities, 43 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 53, 
134–35 (2011). Courts accommodate the influx of cases with “rocket dockets” which, in the spirit of 
robo-signing, do not present even a façade of due process. Michael Corkery, A Florida Court’s 
‘Rocket Docket’ Blasts Through Foreclosure Cases, WALL ST. J., Feb. 18, 2009, at A1, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB123491755140004565 (noting that “rocket dockets” refer to 
the close to 1000 foreclosure cases heard by Lee County judges in a single day). 
 5 Robert Rubinson, A Theory of Access to Justice, 29 J. LEGAL PROF. 89, 109–12 (2005). For 
example, in one case, a federal magistrate noted that “it has taken six years for this relatively sim-
ple claim to work its way this far through the system, approximately two years of that time having 
been expended by the Appeals Council [an entity established to “review” denials of benefits by 
administrative law judges] in deciding that it would not review the claim”). Id. at 111 n.60 (quot-
ing Jacobs v. Barnhart, No. S-01-2788, slip op. 1 n.1 (D. Md. Oct. 7, 2002)); Brief History and 
Current Information about the Appeals Council, OFFICIAL SOCIAL SECURITY WEBSITE, 
www.ssa.gov/appeals/about_ac.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2015). 
 6 Michael M. O’Hear, Plea Bargaining and Procedural Justice, 42 GA. L. REV. 407, 409 
(2008) (“Plea bargaining now dominates the day-to-day operation of the American criminal justice 
system; about ninety-five percent of convictions are obtained by way of a guilty plea.”). Deborah 
Rhode notes that private lawyers hired to defend indigent defendants have a “standard practice” of 
“meet ’em, greet ’em, and plead ’em,” and that overwhelmed courts simply could not accommo-
date lawyers who actually conduct fact investigations and make motions on behalf of their clients. 
Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1785, 1793 (2001). 
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children, as compared to adjudication of matters involving large business en-
tities;7 and the inapplicability of “rules of civil procedure” to “summary pro-
ceedings” that overwhelmingly impact indigent litigants.8 The course may 
also examine, by way of contrast, fora whose degrees of process and resource 
allocation vastly exceed the volume of cases they adjudicate, such as federal 
courts.9 
The Judicial Opinion: 1/10 Credit 
This course, offered during orientation, explores the limited role judi-
cial opinions play in understanding law;10 the overwhelming correlation 
between judges’ political and policy affiliations in predicting judicial out-
comes;11 how endless citations of precedent and legal analysis in opinions 
function as an ex post facto means to justify foregone conclusions;12 and 
judicial opinions as a means for presenting a veneer of rationality and scien-
tific precision.13 As part of this course, students will choose a judicial opin-
                                                                                                                           
 7 Rhode noted that “civil courts take weeks to try a commercial dispute between wealthy 
businesses but give less than five minutes to decide the future of an abused or neglected child 
. . . .” Rhode, supra note 6, at 1793. 
 8 Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 64–65 (1972) (holding that conducting a trial within six 
days of filing a landlord-tenant case, unless the tenant posts bond, does not violate the Constitu-
tion). 
 9 Of nearly one million cases filed in the United States in 2001, less than three percent were in 
the federal system. See BRIAN J. OSTROM ET AL., CONFERENCE OF STATE COURT ADM’RS, BU-
REAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS & NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS’ COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, 
EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS, 2002: A NAT’L PERSPECTIVE FROM THE COURT STA-
TISTICS PROJECT 13 (2003). Furthermore, federal courts marginalize those cases that typically 
involve low-income litigants, such as petitions for habeas corpus and reviews of denials of Social 
Security benefits, as necessary evils, and afford them minimal scrutiny. See Rubinson, supra note 
5, at 107. Instead, federal courts primarily devote their available resources to “high-stakes, ‘bet-
the-the-company’ business cases . . . .” Bryant G. Garth, Tilting the Justice System from ADR as 
Idealistic Movement to a Segmented Market in Dispute Resolution, 18 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 927, 
941 (2002). 
 10 Tracey E. George et al., The New Old Legal Realism, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 689, 691 (2011) 
(questioning whether “pronouncements” in opinions are “in fact an accurate reflection of law as 
understood in the world . . .” and suggesting that “[w]e can better understand law by moving be-
yond our court-centric perspective . . .”). 
 11 One computer model correctly predicted seventy-five percent of Supreme Court outcomes 
based solely on a limited number of variables, such as “ideological direction . . . of the lower court 
ruling,” and without reference to the “facts” of the case. Theodore W. Ruger et al., The Supreme 
Court Forecasting Project: Legal and Political Science Approaches to Predicting Supreme Court 
Decisionmaking, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1150, 1163, 1167 (2004); see also Tracey E. George, Court 
Fixing, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 9, 36 (2001) (noting the importance of, among other things, “policy 
preferences” and “party identification” in predicting judicial outcomes). 
 12 See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 465–66 (1897); 
see also infra notes 50–55 and accompanying text. 
 13 Holmes noted that “the logical method and form flatter that longing for certainty and for 
repose which is in every human mind.” Holmes, supra note 12, at 466. 
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ion of at least sixty pages14 and draft a full explanation of, and basis for, the 
decision in three pages or less.15 NOTE: This course fulfills the legal analy-
sis requirement. 
The Supreme Court I: 1/10 Credit 
This course examines judicial opinions by the High Court. Topics in-
clude the reality that the current Justices have rarely, if ever, represented 
individual clients in practice;16 the extraordinary attention lavished by aca-
demics and other legal commentators on the Court’s hyper-technical argu-
ments and dense thickets of citations and logical forms to justify preexisting 
conclusions;17 the ability to predict decisions across a wide range of sub-
stantive areas based on a judge’s ideology without knowing a single prece-
dent or reading a single brief; 18 an examination of whether the rule that the 
Supreme Court is the only court in which “Court” must be capitalized at all 
times is analogous to the capitalization of the names of Supreme Deities.19 
                                                                                                                           
 14 An overwhelmingly large number of opinions fit this criterion, so the instructor will pro-
vide a more limited list in order to facilitate students’ ability to make a choice. Consider, for ex-
ample, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (177 pages) or District of Columbia v. Heller, 
554 U.S. 570 (2008) (153 pages). See Debra Cassens Weiss, U.S. Supreme Court Sets Record for 
Longest Opinions Ever, A.B.A. J. (Nov. 19, 2010, 11:30 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/
article/u.s._supreme_court_sets_record_for_longest_opinions_ever/. 
 15 In a letter to Harold Laski, Holmes recounted, “I have sent round an opinion in which I take 
three pages to say what should be said in a sentence, but which Brandeis thought ought to be put 
in solemn form because of its importance.” Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold J. Laski 
(Nov. 30, 1917) in HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS 114 (Mark DeWolfe Howe, ed., 1953). In crafting 
this assignment, Holmes’s statement has been reduced to a ratio: three sentences would equal 
about forty words, and three pages, assuming the standard of 250 words per page, would equal 
750 words. This reduces then to the following arithmetic: 40 ÷ 750 = 0.053. Thus, a sixty-page 
opinion times 0.053 equals 3.18, which, after rounding, would equal three pages. Otherwise, 
lengthy concurrences and dissents of individual justices who believe that the nuances of their 
distinct jurisprudence warrant detailed study can be summarized in a sentence or two. 
 16 Benjamin H. Barton, An Empirical Study of Supreme Court Pre-Appointment Experience, 
64 FLA. L. REV. 1137, 1150 (2012). 
 17 See infra notes 50–59 and accompanying text. 
 18 Neal Devins & Lawrence Baum, Split Definitive: How Party Polarization Turned the Su-
preme Court into a Partisan Court, WM. & MARY L. SCH. RES. PAPER NO. 09-276 at 1, 77 (2014), 
abstract available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2432111; Adam Liptak, The Polarized Court, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 10, 2014, at SR1 (quoting Justin Driver, a law professor at the University of Texas, 
who noted that it is becoming “increasingly difficult to contend with a straight face that constitu-
tional law is not simply politics by other means, and that justices are not merely politicians clad in 
fine robes”). 
 19 THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION R. 8, at 86 (Columbia Law Review 
Ass’n et al. eds., 19th ed. 4th prtg. 2011). 
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The Supreme Court II: 8 Credits 
This course focuses on the circumstances faced by litigants in selected 
matters decided by the Court. The topics covered will vary based upon 
available opportunities for observation or participation, but may include 
witnessing an execution in order to assess the Court’s decisions regarding 
whether capital punishment is cruel and unusual;20 visiting homeless shel-
ters and soup kitchens to explore the Court’s jurisprudence on due pro-
cess—specifically how it has not been extended to ensure the right to food, 
shelter, or other means of subsistence;21 residing in an urban neighborhood 
riddled by handgun violence to assess the role that handguns play in con-
temporary society in contrast to the role of well-regulated militias in rural 
America in 1791;22 attempting to exercise First Amendment rights as an 
individual compared with multi-national legal entities that are not human 
beings and which possess massive aggregations of capital;23 assessing how 
the First Amendment promotes the “marketplace of ideas” when entry into 
the marketplace can only be secured by wealthy individuals who have re-
sources to buy ideas sold in the marketplace.24 
Property: 3 Credits 
This course examines the impact of property law on the mass of individ-
uals whose property “interests” are as tenants and owners of modest homes at 
risk of foreclosure or who are homeless and thus do not have one stick, let 
alone a “bundle” of them.25 Most of the course entails interviewing individu-
                                                                                                                           
 20 Judge Alex Kozinski has offered the following reflections on this subject: 
Though I’ve now had a hand in a dozen or more executions, I have never witnessed 
one . . . . I sometimes wonder whether those of us who make life-and-death deci-
sions on a regular basis should not be required to watch as the machinery of death 
grinds up a human being. I ponder what it says about me that I can, with cool preci-
sion, cast votes and write opinions that seal another human being’s fate but lack the 
courage to witness the consequences of my actions. 
Alex Kozinski, Tinkering with Death, NEW YORKER, Feb. 10, 1997, at 52. 
 21 DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989) (holding 
that due process guarantee only extends to “affirmative exercise of [State] power”). 
 22 While most opinions eschew the realities of gun use today, Justice Breyer’s dissent in Hel-
ler offers a rare description of handgun violence, albeit with a statistical cast. 554 U.S. at 681–
723. 
 23 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 318–19 (2010). 
 24 David Kairys, Freedom of Speech, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 
190, 200–12 (David Kairys ed., 1998). 
 25 The metaphor of a “bundle of sticks” or “bundle of rights” is often used to describe legal 
“rights” in property. Lee Ann Fennell, Lumpy Property, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1955, 1978–79 
(2012). 
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als whose homes have been foreclosed,26 who have been evicted,27 or who 
are homeless, and explores the extent to which low and minimum wage jobs 
cannot secure livable and affordable housing.28 There will be no more than 
thirty minutes devoted to government subsidies for mortgage interest, lower 
tax rates for capital gains, or exploration of the “rights” of owners of parcels 
of land named Blackacre and Whiteacre. 
The Unrepresented Client: 6 Credits 
This course will be co-taught by low-income litigants who have claims 
adjudicated with minimal process and without representation. Topics to be 
covered: the overwhelmingly high percentage of litigants who are not repre-
sented in various proceedings and whose cases constitute the majority of 
adjudicated matters;29 the instructors’ experience as low-income litigants in 
the judicial system;30 whether an “adversary system” is truly “adversarial” 
when there is only one lawyer;31 how favoritism impedes the ability of pro 
                                                                                                                           
 26 Arranging such interviews is quite simple given that the supply of foreclosed homes far 
outstrips the number of law students who will need to complete this assignment. For the degree of 
“process” accorded such claims, see sources cited supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 27 See U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV. & U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, H150/09, AMERI-
CAN HOUSING SURVEY FOR THE UNITED STATES: 2009, at 92 (2011) (noting that 169,000 house-
holds were evicted in 2009 alone). 
 28 See generally BARBARA EHRENREICH, NICKEL AND DIMED: ON (NOT) GETTING BY IN 
AMERICA (2001) (detailing author’s reflections on living on poverty-level wages). 
 29 See, e.g., Williams, 760 A.2d at 705 n.6 (“[O]ut of a total of 807,000 civil cases filed in 
District Court Statewide, nearly 570,000 were landlord-tenant cases, but only 21,000 of those 
landlord-tenant cases (3.7%) were contested . . . .” (citing 1998–1999 MD. JUDICIARY ANN. REP., 
Table DC-4 at 77)). See generally Russell Engler, Out of Sight and Out of Line: The Need for 
Regulation of Lawyer’s Negotiations with Unrepresented Poor Persons, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 79 
(1997) (arguing that additional ethical rules should govern negotiations with unrepresented par-
ties). Engler concludes that in such situations, lawyers often mislead and misrepresent the law or 
facts to pro se litigants. Id. at 109, 112. 
 30 See Mark H. Lazerson, In the Halls of Justice, the Only Justice Is in the Halls, in 1 THE 
POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE 119, 119–21 (Richard L. Abel ed., 1982) (describing the bias of 
judges in New York City Housing Courts against tenants, the vast majority of whom were unrep-
resented); MONITORING SUBCOMM., CITY WIDE TASK FORCE ON HOUS. COURT, 5 MINUTE JUS-
TICE OR “AIN’T NOTHING GOING ON BUT THE RENT!” 65–68 (1986) (detailing New York City 
Housing Court judges’ interactions with unrepresented tenants); Russell Engler, And Justice for 
All—Including the Unrepresented Poor: Revisiting the Roles of the Judges, Mediators, and 
Clerks, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1987, 2011–21 (1999). 
 31 DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 5 (2004) (“In most family, housing, bankruptcy, 
and small claims courts, the majority of litigants lack legal representation. Yet . . . too little effort 
has been made to ensure that [the law] is fair or even comprehensible to the average claimant.”). A 
recent study found that, in a Massachusetts jurisdiction, “two-thirds of the tenants who received 
full representation were able to stay in their homes, compared with one-third of those who lacked 
representation.” Task Force on the Civil Right to Counsel, The Importance of Representation in 
Eviction Cases and Homelessness Prevention, BOS. BAR ASS’N 2 (Mar. 2012), http://www.boston
bar.org/docs/default-document-library/bba-crtc-final-3-1-12.pdf; see also Matthew Desmond, Op-
Ed, Tipping the Scales in Housing Court, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2012 at A35. 
2015] Holmes School: Reforming Legal Education Through Realism 39 
se litigants to obtain favorable outcomes;32 self-representation in a variety 
of settings, such as courts and administrative agencies, in which litigants 
who know nothing about court practices and processes face judges, lawyers, 
and clerks who possess intimate knowledge of informal and formal court 
procedures.33 
Professional Responsibility: 3 Credits 
This course explores ethical issues facing the profession. Topics in-
clude: the co-option of the norms of “zealous advocacy” to justify over-the-
top (and lucrative) representation of legal fictions like corporations;34 how 
rhetoric about the central role that lawyers play in the administration of jus-
tice mask professional self-interest; and35 lawyers’ long history of proclaim-
ing the importance of representing low- and moderate-income litigants 
while doing nothing about it.36 
                                                                                                                           
 32 See Engler, supra note 30, at 2013 n.122. 
 33 See Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Le-
gal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 96, 120 (1974). 
 34 Critiques of representation of organizations as if they were people or even of viewing them 
as “things”—what has been called “thingification”—has a long history. See Felix S. Cohen, Tran-
scendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 811 (1935) (critiqu-
ing the “thingification” of corporations and noting that “[n]obody has ever seen a corporation”). 
The notion that corporations are entitled to zealous representation comparable to criminal defend-
ants perhaps reached its apotheosis when a court analogized Powell v. Alabama—a case address-
ing threats of lynching and guilty verdicts against African-American teenagers by white juries in 
segregated Alabama—to representing an organization. 287 U.S. 45, 49, 50 (1932); see also United 
States v. Rad-O-Lite of Phila., Inc., 612 F.2d 740, 743 (3d Cir. 1979) (finding that “an accused has 
no less of a need for effective assistance due to the fact that it is a corporation”). 
 35 DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL PROFESSION 
143 (2000) (“Lawyers, no less than grocers, are motivated by their own occupational interests[,] 
. . . [but w]hat distinguishes the American bar is its ability to present self-regulation as a societal 
value.”).  
 36 JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW? 143 (1983) (noting how “[t]hroughout the 
twentieth century, as judges and lawyers have monotonously conceded, legal institutions have 
defaulted on their obligation to provide justice to all”). Consider the Preamble of the ABA MODEL 
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT: 
A lawyer should be mindful of deficiencies in the administration of justice and of 
the fact that the poor, and sometimes persons who are not poor, cannot afford ade-
quate legal assistance. Therefore, all lawyers should devote professional time and 
resources and use civic influence to ensure equal access to our system of justice for 
all those who because of economic or social barriers cannot afford or secure ade-
quate legal counsel. 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT PMBL. (2013). There are, however, no obligations in the 
Rules for lawyers to do anything about this core “deficiency.” See id. R. 6.1 (providing for “volun-
tary pro bono public service”) (emphasis added). 
40 Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice [Vol. 35:33 
Constitutional Criminal Procedure: 3 Credits 
This course explores the application of the Sixth Amendment to the 
representation of indigent criminal defendants. The course will briefly touch 
upon the constitutional provisions pertaining to criminal prosecutions. It 
will then focus exclusively on plea bargaining and the “procedures” imple-
mented by all criminal courts that cannot accommodate any result other 
than plea bargaining.37 The course will also survey the overwhelming case-
loads of public defenders;38 the characterization of adjudication in the crim-
inal courts as “meet ’em and plead ’em,” “cattle herding,” and “McJus-
tice,”39 and the law of ineffective assistance of counsel, particularly the 
evolving jurisprudence on whether sleeping lawyers in capital cases have 
provided effective assistance of counsel.40 Other topics: the criminalization 
of poverty41 and racialization of criminal prosecutions.42 
                                                                                                                           
 37 See supra note 6 and accompanying text; Michelle Alexander, Go to Trial: Crash the Jus-
tice System, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/11/opinion/sunday/go-
to-trial-crash-the-justice-system.html?_r=0 (“If everyone charged with crimes suddenly exercised 
his constitutional rights, there would not be enough judges, lawyers or prison cells to deal with the 
ensuing tsunami of litigation.”). The Supreme Court itself has recognized (or at least a majority of 
the Supreme Court has recognized) the “simple reality” that “[n]inety-seven percent of federal 
convictions and ninety-four percent of state convictions are the result of guilty pleas.” Missouri v. 
Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012). In fact, the Court quoted with approval the following: “To a 
large extent . . . horse trading [between prosecutor and defense counsel] determines who goes to 
jail and for how long. That is what plea bargaining is. It is not some adjunct to the criminal justice 
system: it is the criminal justice system.” Id. (quoting Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea 
Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1912 (1992)). An empirical study about discovery 
in criminal cases tellingly reveals that there is no discovery in ninety-two percent of homicide 
cases and 93.6% of felonies other than homicide. Monroe H. Freedman, An Ethical Manifesto for 
Public Defenders, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 911, 912–13 (2005). 
 38 See John Rudolf, Pennsylvania Public Defenders Rebel Against Crushing Caseload, HUFF-
INGTON POST, (June 16, 2012, 11:18 AM), www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/30/pennsylvania-
public-defenders_n_1556192.html (chronicling lives of public defenders who regularly handle 120 
clients at a time). Such overwhelming caseloads led to the filing of a class action lawsuit alleging 
underfunding of a public defender’s office. Michael P. Buffer, Failed Public Defender Settlement 
Up for Discussion, CITIZENS’ VOICE, Feb. 6, 2013, http://citizensvoice.com/news/failed-public-
defender-settlement-up-for-discussion-1.1440258. 
 39 Alexendra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1343 (2012). 
 40 See Tippins v. Walker, 77 F.3d 682, 683 (2d Cir. 1996). Tippins applied a three step analy-
sis to determine whether a sleeping attorney violates a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment 
right to assistance of counsel: “(1) did counsel sleep for repeated and/or prolonged lapses; (2) was 
counsel actually unconscious; and (3) were the defendant’s interests at stake while counsel was 
asleep?” Burdine v. Johnson, 66 F. Supp. 2d 854, 863–64 (S.D. Tex. 1999), aff’d, 262 F.3d 336 
(5th Cir. 2001); see also Tippins, 77 F.3d at 687–89. Other jurisdictions exhibit a similarly lax 
attitude toward sleeping counsel. See Muniz v. Smith, 647 F.3d 619, 623–24 (6th Cir. 2011); Javor 
v. United States, 724 F.2d 831, 834 (9th Cir. 1984). For example, the Ninth Circuit held that coun-
sel must sleep for a “substantial portion of his trial” in order for there to be ineffective assistance 
of counsel. Javor, 724 F.2d at 834. The court in Muniz v. Smith further elaborated on this develop-
ing area of the law. See 647 F.3d at 623–24. The Muniz Court found “that Muniz’s attorney was 
asleep for an undetermined portion of a single cross-examination” but “not asleep for the entire 
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Law and Commerce: 1 Credit 
This course provides an overview of the ways attorneys can generate 
substantial compensation by representing large organizations. The course 
will only briefly address the “substantive” areas of law on which such rep-
resentation typically focuses, such as taxation and business organizations. 
The course will instead explore why less lucrative areas of legal services, 
such as representing low-income litigants who otherwise could not afford 
representation, pay too little to service the debt students incur to afford law 
school tuition.43 
Gender, Race, Socioeconomics, and Intersectionality: 3 Credits 
This course explores how individual experience defines one’s interpre-
tation of “law,” while the leading interpreters of “law” maintain that their 
conclusions are driven by “strict interpretation” and plain meaning of the 
                                                                                                                           
cross since he objected near the end of questioning,” and thus Muniz “[could not] establish that his 
trial counsel was asleep for a substantial portion of his trial.” Id. If time permits, the course will 
explore how these holdings reflect the framers’ intent, which can be discerned in light of the how 
the Constitutional Convention took place in the oppressive heat of a Philadelphia summer in 1787. 
Given this weather, the framers no doubt were fatigued, and thus they both experienced and un-
derstood the value of sleep while deliberating about the founding document of the nation. For a 
discussion of Philadelphia weather during the Constitutional Convention, see SUPPLEMENT TO 
MAX FARRAND’S THE RECORDS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 325–26 
(James H. Hutson ed., 1987 ) (examining historical weather records and finding that the average 
temperature in Philadelphia in 1787 was 93.8 degrees from June through September). 
 41 Kaaryn Gustafson, The Criminalization of Poverty, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 643 
(2009). See generally Richard Delgado, “Rotten Social Background:” Should the Criminal Law 
Recognize a Defense of Severe Environment Deprivation?, 3 LAW & INEQ. 9 (1985) (arguing for 
recognition of a “rotten social background” defense to criminal responsibility); Richard Delgado, 
The Wretched of the Earth, 2 ALA. C. R. & C.L. L. REV. 1 (2011) (discussing what the refusal to 
recognize a rotten social background defense means for society); Darrell Steffensmeier et al., The 
Interaction of Race, Gender, and Age in Criminal Sentencing: The Punishment Cost of Being 
Young, Black, and Male, 36 CRIMINOLOGY 763 (1998) (examining the impact of race, gender, and 
age in criminal sentencing). 
 42 See Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in African 
American Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271, 1272, 1281–95 (2004). Approximately one-third 
of African-American men in their twenties are being supervised by a branch of criminal justice 
system. Id. at 1272. 
 43 For 2014, the median entry level salary at a legal services organization was $44,600, while 
the starting salary at a large private firm in a city was $160,000. Jobs & JDs—Class of 2013 Se-
lected Findings, NAT’L ASS’N FOR LAW PLACEMENT (Aug. 2014), http://www.nalp.org/uploads/
Classof2013SelectedFindings.pdf. As noted by James Leipold, Executive Director of the National 
Association of Law Placement, “public interest and public sector salaries have just kept pace with 
inflation” while “the cost of legal education and the average amount of law student loan debt have 
both risen at a much higher pace,” thus creating “significant economic disincentives . . . as law 
students consider whether or not to pursue public interest law careers.” Press Release, Nat’l Ass’n 
for Law Placement, New Public Interest and Public Sector Salary Figures from NALP Show Little 
Growth Since 2004 (Oct. 18, 2012), http://www.nalp.org/2012_pubint_salaries. 
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“law.”44 The course is supplemented by work from social psychologists 
who have demonstrated how humans assume that their life circumstances 
are the same as everyone else’s, and how affluent individuals are certain 
that their own affluence is due to merit and not privilege or luck.45 
Legal Education: 3 Credits 
An exploration of how legal education, with the exception of the 
Holmes School of Law, has nothing to do with law.46 This course will focus 
on the usefulness of pre-digested hypotheticals when no client has ever pre-
sented an attorney with a fact pattern or “Statement of Facts”; assessing 
whether the “case method” reflects the realities of adjudication, especially 
where freedom and safety are at stake, such as in criminal prosecution and 
child abuse and neglect proceedings,47 and the misleading perception that 
elite law schools produce more “competent” practitioners.48 
This Proposal, having set forth a Mission Statement in Part I and a 
course catalogue in Part II, will now elaborate on the Proposal’s underlying 
basis. As Part III explains, Oliver Wendell Holmes rejected the idea that 
logic—the purported core of conventional legal analysis—constitutes law. 
This is a “dangerous idea” because it subverts the norms of legal education 
and judicial decision making. Part IV contrasts the pedagogy of the Holmes 
School with traditional legal education in light of Holmes’s dangerous idea. 
Part V examines the educational methodology of the Holmes School. Part 
VI identifies, and counters, the most obvious objections to this Proposal. 
                                                                                                                           
 44 Richard A. Posner, The Incoherence of Antonin Scalia, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 24, 2012, avail-
able at http://www.newrepublic.com/article/magazine/books-and-arts/106441/scalia-garner-reading-
the-law-textual-originalism. 
 45 See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and 
Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 3 (Daniel L. Kahneman et 
al. eds., 1982); RICHARD NISBETT & LEE ROSS, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORT-
COMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT 19–20, 231 (1980). For a summary of relevant literature in this 
area, see Robert Rubinson, The Polyphonic Courtroom: Expanding the Possibilities of Judicial 
Discourse, 101 DICK. L. REV. 3, 28 (1996). A pithier quote expresses the same idea: the affluent 
“[were] born on third base and think[] [they] hit a triple.” For a linguistic analysis of this well-
known phrase, see SEANA COULSON, SEMANTIC LEAPS: FRAME-SHIFTING AND CONCEPTUAL 
BLENDING IN MEANING CONSTRUCTION 172 (2001).  
 46 See infra notes 51–70 and accompanying text.  
 47 See supra notes 3–10 and accompanying text.  
 48 William D. Henderson & Rachel M. Zahorsky, The Pedigree Problem: Are Law School 
Ties Choking the Profession?, 98 A.B.A J. 36, 37 (2012). 
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III. INTELLECTUAL FOUNDATIONS: HOLMES’S DANGEROUS IDEA49 
The founding principles of the Holmes School of Law are drawn from 
ideas articulated by Oliver Wendell Holmes and other legal realists who 
wrote primarily in the early twentieth century.50 Holmes challenged the log-
ical foundation of “law” and, by extension, traditional legal education.51 He 
argued that judicial decisions are not, and could not be, products of logic, 
but rather products of submerged judgments and policy preferences.52 Alt-
hough legal scholars still hold Holmes in high esteem,53 the full conse-
quences of his ideas remain too outré for mainstream conceptions of law.54 
Holmes’s famous essay The Path of the Law captures the essence of 
his critique: 
The language of judicial decision is mainly the language of logic 
. . . [b]ut certainty generally is illusion . . . . Behind the logical 
form lies a judgment as to the relative worth and importance of 
competing legislative grounds, often an inarticulate and uncon-
scious judgment, it is true, and yet the very root and nerve of the 
whole proceeding. You can give any conclusion a logical form 
. . . . [Such a conclusion, however,] is because of some belief as to 
the practice of the community or of a class, or because of some 
opinion as to policy, or, in short, because of some attitude of 
yours upon a matter not capable of exact quantitative measure-
                                                                                                                           
 49 The phrase “dangerous idea” comes from DANIEL C. DENNETT, DARWIN’S DANGEROUS 
IDEA: EVOLUTION AND THE MEANINGS OF LIFE 18 (1995). 
 50 For a collection of seminal writings from the realist school, see generally AMERICAN LE-
GAL REALISM (William W. Fisher, III et al. eds., 1993). 
 51 See Holmes, supra note 12, at 465–66. 
 52 See id. 
 53 See Richard A. Posner, Introduction, THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES, at ix (Richard A. Posner 
ed., 1992) (describing Holmes as “the most illustrious figure in the history of American law” and 
“a major figure in American intellectual and cultural history generally”). For recent applications of 
the realist critique, see generally George et al., supra note 10; Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sun-
stein, The New Legal Realism, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 831 (2008). Legal realism also laid the founda-
tion for feminist jurisprudence and critical race theory. See Martha Albertson Fineman, Gender 
and the Law: Feminist Legal Theory’s Role in the New Legal Realism, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 405, 
409, 430–31; Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with 
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 324 (1987) (proposing a cultural meaning test to 
assess how judges’ and society’s unconscious racism obscures the role racism plays in the devel-
opment of law). 
 54 When he was ninety-one years old, Holmes himself reflected that his ideas were merely his 
“old chestnuts” that remained unrealized. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Frederick 
Pollock (Apr. 21, 1932), in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES, supra note 53, at 21. 
44 Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice [Vol. 35:33 
ment, and therefore not capable of founding exact logical conclu-
sions.55 
The following Chinese proverb echoes Holmes’s sentiment: “A judge de-
cides for ten reasons/nine of which nobody knows.”56 
Succeeding realists explored the extraordinary technical skill brought 
to bear in efforts to present conclusions in logical dress. Felix Cohen, for 
example, satirizes a formalist “heaven” in which he describes a 
dialectic-hydraulic-interpretation press, which could press an in-
definite number of meanings out of any text or statute, an appa-
ratus for constructing fictions, and a hair-splitting machine that 
could divide a single hair into 999,999 equal parts and, when op-
erated by the most expert jurists, could split each of these parts 
again into 999,999 equal parts.57 
The image of the “dialectic-hydraulic-interpretive press” illustrates how any 
judgment can be presented in logical form.58 Hairs can be split in numerous 
ways. The splitting might seem “objective” or “true” but, according to Holmes, 
the splitting is a means to justify a conclusion rather than a means to reach a 
conclusion.59 
In place of its traditional definition, Holmes offered an alternative 
view of law.60 According to Holmes, law is “[t]he prophecies of what the 
courts will do in fact, and nothing more . . . .”61 “Courts in fact” are what 
courts do in fact; they are situated within a factual matrix.62 Moreover, facts 
are textured and variegated, having little to do with the misleadingly 
                                                                                                                           
 55 Holmes, supra note 12, at 465–66. Holmes reiterated his rejection of logical form by writ-
ing that “[t]he felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of 
public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-
men, have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men 
should be governed.” OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (Boston, Little, Brown & 
Co. 44th Publ’g 1951). 
 56 See Steven L. Winter, The Cognitive Dimension of the Agon Between Legal Power and 
Narrative Meaning, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2225, 2225 (1989) (quoting W.S. MERWIN, ASIAN FIGURES 
65 (1973)). 
 57 Cohen, supra note 34, at 809. 
 58 See id.; Holmes, supra note 12, at 465–66. 
 59 See Holmes, supra note 12, at 465–66. 
 60 To clarify, the Proposal will designate the right conception, that is, what the Holmes School 
will teach, as law without quotation marks, and designate the wrong conception, that is, what 
every other law school teaches (or, rather, what every other “law” school teaches), as “law.” 
 61 Holmes, supra note 12, at 461. 
 62 The notion of law being “in” something evokes a “container metaphor.” See GEORGE 
LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY 92 (1980). This metaphor extends to the 
way in which people critique arguments: “Your argument doesn’t have much content. That argu-
ment has holes in it . . . . I’m tired of your empty arguments. You won’t find that idea in his argu-
ment. That conclusion falls out of my argument. Your argument won’t hold water . . . .” Id. 
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stripped down “statement of facts” in judicial opinions, which are tellingly 
situated as an introduction to the main event—the interpretation of “law.” 
Holmes further identifies what is not law.63 Law is not the law of con-
tracts, criminal law, property law, or family law. Law is not treatises; and 
contrary to what children learn in grammar school, law is not what the leg-
islative branch legislates, the executive branch executes, or the judicial 
branch judges.64 Law is not appellate opinions, despite being subject to la-
ser-like scrutiny.65 An opinion alone, without the facts that gave rise to the 
decision, is thus “hopelessly oversimplified.”66 All of these things collec-
tively are what Richard Posner has called “law’s traditional preoccupa-
tions,”67 which are, not coincidentally, the “traditional preoccupations” of 
legal education.68 
For Holmes, law is the lived experience of a civil defendant in a debt 
collection case, or a criminal defendant facing drug charges, or a tenant 
seeking to avoid eviction, or a mother seeking to retain custody of her child. 
These, for sure, fall superficially into the respective laws of contracts, crim-
inal law, property law, and family law. But the “law”—rules, procedures, 
cases—that “define” these areas do not tell us much.69 Or, at least, they tell 
us much less than an inside-out perspective with “law” as merely one piece 
of the picture—and a pretty unimportant one at that.70 
Law also pervades lives in ways that have nothing to do with courts or 
adjudication. For example, masses of forms, legal regulations, interviews, 
and hours of waiting in line confront low-income people at every turn.71 For 
those who live in poverty, Stephen Wexler characterizes law as a persistent 
intrusion in, if not an integral element of, their lives: 
                                                                                                                           
 63 HOLMES, supra note 55, at 1. 
 64 Devera B. Scott et al., The Assault on Judicial Independence and the Uniquely Delaware 
Response, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 217, 248 (2009) (“education has to start at the earliest levels by 
teaching school children at a young age about the doctrine of separation of powers and the rule of 
law”). As the premise of the Holmes School demonstrates, children should also learn “at a young 
age” about the limitations of the “rule of law.” 
 65 Jerome Frank, Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-School?, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 907, 910 (1933). 
 66 Id. at 912–13. 
 67 Richard A. Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, in THE REVIVAL OF PRAGMATISM: NEW ES-
SAYS ON SOCIAL THOUGHT, LAW, AND CULTURE 235, 248 (Morris Dickstein ed., 1998). 
 68 See infra notes 84–86 and accompanying text. 
 69 See Posner, supra note 67, at 248. 
 70 See id. Instead, Holmes argues that “[t]he life of the law has not been logic: it has been 
experience.” HOLMES, supra note 55, at 1. According to one commentator, Holmes’s concept of 
“experience” includes “everything that arises out of the interaction of the human organism with its 
environment: beliefs, sentiments, customs, values, policies, prejudices . . . .” LOUIS MENAND, THE 
METAPHYSICAL CLUB 341–42 (2001). 
 71 See Stephen Wexler, Practicing Law for Poor People, 79 YALE L. J. 1049, 1049–50 
(1970). 
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Poor people do not have legal problems like those of the private 
plaintiffs and defendants in law school casebooks . . . . Poor peo-
ple do not lead settled lives into which the law seldom intrudes; 
they are constantly involved with the law in its most intrusive 
forms . . . . [P]oor people are always bumping into sharp legal 
things.72 
These experiences are law. 
Getting a handle on this Holmesian view of law is no easy task, as 
Holmes himself seemed to recognize. Louis Brandeis suggested to Holmes 
that he study “some domain of fact” such as “the textile industries in Mas-
sachusetts and after reading the reports sufficiently . . . ,” he should “go to 
Lawrence and get a human notion of how it really is.”73 By Brandeis’s esti-
mation, Lawrence, Massachusetts—the site of a massive textile industry in 
which a largely female, poor, immigrant population worked and lived in 
deplorable conditions and conducted a strike of historic significance to the 
labor movement—was a good place to go to capture the lived experience 
that constitutes law.74 Holmes’s ambivalence about taking the trip, however, 
                                                                                                                           
 72 Id. In contrast, indignities affecting the non-poor generate attention and sometimes outrage. 
The injustice of speed cameras, for example, has triggered a constitutional challenge. See 
Mendenhall v. City of Akron, 374 F. App’x 598, 599 (6th Cir. 2010). The horrors of airline de-
lays, another plague of the non-poor, have also prompted legislative action through what is offi-
cially known as the “Tarmac Delay Rule.” Jennifer Henry & Mary Gardner, The New Tarmac 
Delay Rule and the Volcanic Ash Cloud over European Air Space: One Year Later, 76 J. AIR L. & 
COM. 633, 634–50 (2011). Notably, the wretched service of most urban bus lines generates little 
outrage even though such service leads to far more serious consequences than air travel inconven-
iences or traffic tickets. See TODD LITMAN, VICTORIA TRANSP. POLICY INST., LESSONS FROM 
KATRINA AND RITA: WHAT MAJOR DISASTERS CAN TEACH TRANSPORTATION PLANNERS 6 
(2006) (noting that, in “most North American cities,” the “service quality” of public transportation 
is “minimal,” leading to “a huge difference in convenience, comfort and safety between motorists 
and non-motorists (and therefore between wealthy and poor . . . .) . . .”). For instance, poor public 
transportation affects a person’s ability to adapt to the unpredictable schedules of many low-wage 
jobs, to manage childcare, and to transport children to school. No effort has been made to codify a 
“bus passenger bill of rights” for delays, mechanical breakdowns, or lack of safety despite the 
pervasiveness of these problems. Reliance on public transportation can also have tragic conse-
quences. See id. After Hurricane Katrina, the New Orleans mass transit system automatically 
transported stranded residents—virtually all of whom were low-income—to the New Orleans 
Superdome where they had no choice but to live in the chaos, danger, and squalor to be found 
there. Id.at 3. 
 73 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Frederick Pollock (May 26, 1919) in 2 HOLMES-
POLLOCK LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND SIR FREDERICK POL-
LOCK, 1874–1932, at 13–14 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1942) [hereinafter 2 HOLMES-POLLOCK 
LETTERS]. 
 74 See id. Lawrence was the site of a strike popularly known as the “Bread and Roses 
Strike”—an important event in the history of the American labor movement. See WILLIAM CAHN, 
LAWRENCE 1912: THE BREAD AND ROSES STRIKE 1 (Esther Cohen ed., 1980); 4 PHILIP S. FONER, 
HISTORY OF THE LABOR MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 306–28 (1965). Brandeis’s sugges-
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was palpable: the trip “would be good for . . . the performance of my du-
ties” but would be a “bore.”75 
Subsequent realists expanded upon Holmes’s dangerous idea. Karl N. 
Llewellyn emphasized the contingencies of real life that affect a litigant’s 
ability to recover under a rule of “law.”76 For example, in describing the 
“law” that governs a party’s “right” to demand performance under a con-
tract, Llewellyn explained that 
if the other party does not perform as agreed, you can sue, and if 
you have a fair lawyer, and nothing goes wrong with your wit-
nesses or the jury, and you give up four or five days of time and 
some ten to thirty percent of the proceeds, and wait two to twenty 
months, you will probably get a judgment for a sum considerably 
less than what the performance would have been worth—which, 
if the other party is solvent and has not secreted his assets, you 
can in further due course collect with six percent interest for the 
delay.77 
In a different vein, Felix Cohen drew upon Holmes’s conception of law 
as a social act.78 For instance, Cohen argued that judicial opinions are based 
on human activity rather than the development of precedent, and noted that 
a judicial decision “is an intersection of social forces: Behind the decision 
are social forces that play upon it to give it a resultant momentum and direc-
tion; beyond the decision are human activities affected by it.”79 
In the end, then, the fundamental premise of “realism,” and, by exten-
sion, of the Holmes School of Law, is that law is about how the mass of 
people live in the world.80 Conventional law school curricula do not define 
law in this way, and this is to maintain legitimacy as an “objective” analysis 
driven by the rigorous application of logic.81 Such realities of law are too 
messy and too subversive of popular conceptions of “the rule of law” to 
comport with law schools’ focus on logic.82 The Holmes School of Law 
                                                                                                                           
tion contained particular bite given that Lawrence is less than thirty miles from Boston, where 
Holmes grew up, and thus would require minimal effort on Holmes’s part to see “how it really is.” 
 75 2 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS, supra note 73, at 13–14. 
 76 See Cohen, supra note 34, at 843; Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence—The Next 
Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431, 437–38 (1930). 
 77 Llewellyn, supra note 76, at 437–38. 
 78 See Cohen, supra note 34, at 843. 
 79 Id. at 843. 
 80 See supra notes 69–72 and accompanying text. 
 81 See supra notes 51–68 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 84–86 and accompany-
ing text. 
 82 For instance, the father of modern law school pedagogy, Christopher Columbus Langdell, 
argued that, to improve legal education, it was “indispensable to establish at least two things: first, 
that law is a science; secondly, that all the available materials of that science are contained in 
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thus seeks to determine (1) what law is in all its messiness, social contexts, 
and assumptions—its reality “on the ground,” and (2) what law is to the 
vast majority of litigants who have few or no resources. 
IV. THE PEDAGOGY OF THE HOLMES SCHOOL 
The Holmes School of Law builds upon critiques of “law” and legal 
education that extend back over a century.83 This Proposal examines how 
the Holmes School’s curriculum fits into prior critiques of legal education, 
how its premises differ from other calls for reform, and how it will imple-
ment its signature pedagogy to achieve its goals. 
A. Langdellian Science and Logic vs. Clinical Education  
and “Practical Knowledge” 
Well over one hundred years ago, Christopher Columbus Langdell de-
veloped the “case method”—the law school pedagogy that has remained the 
bedrock of legal education ever since.84 The case method assumes that cases 
are the lifeblood of “law,” and that “thinking like a lawyer” entails develop-
ing or “synthesizing” rules from cases to produce certain results.85 As any 
first year law student knows, the case method is the primary—if not the ex-
clusive—vehicle for learning what “law” is.86 
                                                                                                                           
printed books.” Christopher C. Langdell, Address at the Commemoration of the 250th Anniversary 
of the Founding of Harvard College (Nov. 5, 1886), in A RECORD OF THE COMMEMORATION, 
NOVEMBER FIFTH TO EIGHTH, 1886, ON THE TWO HUNDRED AND FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF 
THE FOUNDING OF HARVARD COLLEGE 85 (1887). 
 83 See, e.g., Byron D. Cooper, The Integration of Theory, Doctrine, and Practice in Legal 
Education, 1 J. ASS’N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 50, 50 (2002); Alan Watson, Legal Education 
Reform: Modest Suggestions, 51 J. LEGAL EDUC. 91, 91–92 (2001). By far the most influential 
studies of legal education are contained in two sources. The first was issued in 1992 and is univer-
sally known as the “MacCrate Report.” AM. BAR ASS’N TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHS. & THE PRO-
FESSION: NARROWING THE GAP, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT—AN 
EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM (1992) [hereinafter MACCRATE REPORT]. The second, issued in 
1997, is the study popularly known as the “Carnegie Report.” WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., 
EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAW (2007) [hereinafter CARNE-
GIE REPORT]. A third is ROY STUCKEY ET AL., BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION: A VI-
SION AND A ROAD MAP (2007). 
 84 ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL 52–53 (1983); Margaret Martin Barry et al., Clinical 
Education for This Millennium: The Third Wave, 7 CLINICAL L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2000). One article 
has characterized Langdell as a “straw man” for simplistic (if not simple-minded) formalism. 
Catharine Pierce Wells, Langdell and the Invention of Legal Doctrine, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 551, 
551–52 (2010). Whether Langdell was fully responsible for the formalist curriculum so character-
istic of law school is, for purposes this Proposal, not important. What is important is that these 
norms remain the foundation of legal education as it exists today. 
 85 See Paul Figley, Teaching Rule Synthesis with Real Cases, 61 J. LEGAL EDUC. 245, 246 
(2011) (discussing “principles of rule synthesis” from appellate opinions). 
 86 This footnote is inserted solely for the sake of appearances. Any informed reader does not 
need support for this proposition. 
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Jerome Frank offered an early and still idiosyncratic critique of the 
case method by attacking the very idea that the “case” method deals with 
“cases.”87 Frank observed that students do not study cases; rather “[t]heir 
attention is restricted to judicial opinions. But an opinion is not a deci-
sion.”88 The case method, according to Frank, is really the opinion meth-
od.89 An “opinion” says nothing about decision making or why a judge 
reached a particular decision.90 The case method fails for many reasons: (1) 
it “disclos[es] merely a fractional part of how decisions come into being;” 
(2) it encourages within a lawyer and law student “a treacherously false 
sense of certainty in advising clients;” (3) it “is hopelessly oversimplified;” 
and (4) it fails to take into account “the slippery character of ‘the facts’ of a 
case.”91 
A more widely articulated critique not only rejects the value of exam-
ining cases, opinions, and decisions, but rather advocates for focusing on 
“practice.”92 This critique leads directly into the motivation behind the clin-
ical education movement.93 
Professors and practitioners have consistently advocated for clinical 
education since the nineteenth century.94 Consider the following selection 
of quotations: 
Professor Blewett Lee of Harvard Law School in 1896: 
It is odd if our profession is the only one in which students cannot 
have a practical training before they enter their life-work . . . . 
[M]ost law students still go forth upon a long suffering public 
having only read books and disputed over them. The evil of this 
condition cannot be remedied by any half measures, or cheap de-
vices or cheap men. To give practical instruction in law work will 
require immense intellectual labor, and the finest quality of teach-
ing—but let us not say it is impossible because we have never 
done it . . . .95 
                                                                                                                           
 87 See Frank, supra note 65, at 910. 
 88 Id. 
 89 See id. 
 90 See supra notes 52–66 and accompanying text. 
 91 See Frank, supra note 65, at 911, 913, 919. 
 92 See Barry et al., supra note 84, at 6–7. 
 93 For an overview of the history of clinical education, see generally Barry et al., supra note 
84. 
 94 One could make a plausible argument that apprenticeship—the foundation of legal educa-
tion in the United States before states began requiring law school graduation for bar admittance—
is itself clinical legal education, but, in practice, these apprenticeships were ad hoc affairs and 
certainly had no systematic pedagogy—a defining characteristic of clinical education. See infra 
notes 95–97 and accompanying text. 
 95 Blewett Lee, Teaching Practice in Law Schools, 19 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 507, 518 (1896). 
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William V. Rowe in 1917: 
[A] knowledge of practice can be acquired only by practicing 
. . . . It is folly to waste time in the effort to teach practice in the 
classroom in the customary manner . . . . [The] familiar idea of 
the clinic, to be adapted to the teaching of law, by bringing the 
law office, with this “direct atmosphere of daily professional 
life,” to the law school and the student . . . [would fill] . . . this 
needless and dangerous gap in legal training.”96 
Jerome Frank in 1933 in an article entitled Why Not a Clinical Law 
School?: 
[A] considerable part of the teaching staff of a law school should 
consist of lawyers who already had varied experience in practice 
. . . . What is intended is that, almost at the beginning of and dur-
ing his law-school days, the student should learn the very limited 
(although real) importance of the actual legal world of so-called 
substantive law and of so-called legal rules and principles. He 
should learn that “legal rights” and “duties” mean merely what 
may some day happen at the end of specific lawsuits . . . . He 
should learn that judges are fallible human beings and that legal 
rights often depend on the unpredictable reactions of those falli-
ble human beings to a multitude of stimuli . . . .97 
Despite these longstanding critiques, clinical education only came into 
its own in the 1960s, when it “solidified . . . its foothold in the academy.”98 
Depending on the institution, however, many issues continue to bedevil 
clinical education. Such issues include law schools’ willingness to develop 
or maintain a “clinical program” with limited resources, the status and job 
security of clinical faculty (if, indeed, they are even called “faculty”), and 
the condescension of teachers of “doctrinal courses” who contend that clin-
ics merely teach “skills,” not “theory” or “doctrine,” which require greater 
intelligence and sophistication.99 
                                                                                                                           
 96 William V. Rowe, Legal Clinics and Better Trained Lawyers—A Necessity, 11 ILL. L. REV. 
591, 595–96 (1917). 
 97 Frank, supra note 65, at 917, 919. 
 98 Barry et al., supra note 84, at 12. 
 99 See supra notes 84–98 and accompanying text. Other battles are, for the most part, won. 
Clinicians have had their own law journal—the Clinical Law Review—since 1994, and so-called 
“clinical scholarship” appears regularly in student-edited journals. See CLINICAL L. REV, 
http://searchworks.stanford.edu/view/6307454 (last visited Jan. 3, 2015) (noting beginning date in 
1994); see, e.g., Frank, supra note 65; Rowe, supra note 96. 
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Clinical legal education has nevertheless been remarkably successful 
in establishing the importance of teaching lawyers how to practice.100 
B. The Ensuing Debate: Theory and Practice and Why It Is Beside the Point 
There is a longstanding tension between “theory” and “practice,” “doc-
trinal” and “clinical.” The “Carnegie Report”101—a recent assessment of legal 
education—characterizes the debate as a “conflict between defenders of theo-
retical legal learning and champions of a legal education that includes intro-
duction to the practice of law.”102 Studies of legal education, including the 
“MacCrate Report”103 and the Carnegie Report, attempt to resolve the tension 
between conceptions of law school as a professional school teaching students 
how to be lawyers, and as an “academic institution” devoted to scientific and 
“theoretical” inquiry about law.104 These efforts see both views as comple-
mentary, and propose integrating them to create more comprehensive legal 
education. For example, the authors of the Carnegie Report frame their pro-
ject as “seek[ing] to unite the two sides of legal knowledge: formal 
knowledge and experience of practice.”105 The goal of legal education thus 
should be “to bring the teaching and learning of legal doctrine into more fruit-
ful dialogue with the pedagogies of practice” and “to bridge the gap between 
analytical and practical [legal] knowledge.”106 
The Holmes School of Law, in contrast, would reject the purported di-
chotomy between the “theoretical” and “practical.” They are not, as the Car-
negie Report frames it, “two sides of legal knowledge;” they do not describe 
                                                                                                                           
 100 The American Bar Association’s Standard 303 of its Standards and Rules of Procedure for 
Approval of Law Schools—the basis for law school accreditation—requires that a law school 
offer “substantial opportunities for: (1) law clinics or field placement(s); and (2) student participa-
tion in pro bono legal services, including law-related public service activities.” SECTION OF LE-
GAL EDUCATION & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, 2014-2015 ABA STANDARDS AND RULES OF PRO-
CEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS, Standard 303(b)(1)–(2) (2014–2015), http://www.
americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/resources/standards.html. 
 101 CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 83, at 3. 
 102 Id. at 8. 
 103 See supra note 83 and accompanying text. The Carnegie Foundation also funded a much 
earlier assessment of legal education called the “Reed Report.” ALFRED ZANTZINGER REED, 
TRAINING FOR THE PUBLIC PROFESSION OF THE LAW—HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT AND PRINCI-
PAL CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS OF LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES WITH SOME 
ACCOUNT OF CONDITIONS IN ENGLAND AND CANADA, at xiv-xviii (1921). The crux of the Reed 
Report’s conception of legal education is familiar: “general education, theoretical knowledge of 
the law, and practical skills training.” Barry et al., supra note 84, at 7. 
 104 The Carnegie Report does an excellent job tracing the origins of this tension. See CARNE-
GIE REPORT, supra note 83, at 4–8. 
 105 WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PROFES-
SION OF LAW SUMMARY 8 (2007) [hereinafter CARNEGIE REPORT SUMMARY]. 
 106 CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 83, at 12; CARNEGIE REPORT SUMMARY, supra note 105, 
at 8. 
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collectively or separately what law is.107 Rather, the Holmes School would 
examine what happens when people encounter rules (regulatory, statutory, or 
constitutional), procedures (whether formal or informal108), court forms, 
clerks, social workers, and lawyers,109 and explores legal claims that are not 
asserted because potential litigants do not know they have them.110 What ex-
actly are “practical skills” and “theory” when neither has meaning in actual 
experience;111 when “process” accorded litigants is wildly divergent and, at 
times, chaotic and virtually non-existent; 112 when any “theory” is, in the end, 
based on personal experience, which likely has nothing to do with “on the 
ground” interactions with law?113 Answering these questions, or recognizing 
that these questions are worth asking, or, even admitting that these questions 
exist, is a core goal of the Holmes School of Law. 
                                                                                                                           
 107 CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 83, at 12; see supra notes 60–70 and accompanying text. 
 108 For instance, one court in Maryland—called “Rent Court”—was created by administrative 
fiat, and imposed faux “jurisdictional limitations” with no legislative basis. See Williams v. Hous. 
Auth., 760 A.2d 697, 698, 700, 703 (Md. 2000) (noting that the district court dismissed low-
income tenant’s action on the grounds that “rent division” lacked jurisdiction, even though there is 
no separate “rent division” in Baltimore City). Low-income litigants must also contend with the 
vagaries of clerks who might or might not adhere to procedural rules, which, in turn, may preclude 
such litigants from pursuing claims that they probably did not know they had in the first place 
because they did not have lawyers. See supra notes 31–33 and accompanying text. Finally, low-
income litigants are often relegated to “pleadings” of the “check the box” variety, which is one 
way courts manage to dispose of hundreds of thousands of cases. See supra notes 3–9 and accom-
panying text. It is notable that courts deploy, or are forced to deploy, such administrative conven-
iences when safety and shelter is at risk as opposed to conflicts involving large entities, which 
warrant a far greater allocation of judicial resources. See supra notes 3–9 and accompanying text. 
 109 Note that lawyers are stuck in the middle of a long list. The reason for this is that most 
litigants don’t have lawyers. Their interactions with law are more often with clerks, social work-
ers, or public assistance caseworkers than with lawyers. See supra notes 29–33 and accompanying 
text. 
 110 Law schools and legal scholars rarely (if ever) address the issue of proto-claims that do not 
reach the level of recognized claims. A rare example is William L.F. Felstiner et al., The Emer-
gence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming . . . , 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 
631, 631 (1980–1981). As in a Sherlock Holmes story, where the most significant clue was a dog 
that did not bark in the night, what is not claimed is as important as what is, especially when what 
is not claimed is often attributable to an inability to afford representation. See SIR ARTHUR CO-
NAN DOYLE, Silver Blaze, in THE MEMOIRS OF SHERLOCK HOLMES (John Murray & Jonathan 
Cape 1974) (1893). 
 111 According to the drafters of the Carnegie Report, “legal analysis is the prior condition for 
practice because it supplies the essential background assumptions and rules for engaging with the 
world through the medium of the law.” CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 83, at 13. This formula-
tion, however, has it exactly backwards: the world itself furnishes the essential background as-
sumptions for application of legal analysis. 
 112 See supra notes 3–9 and accompanying text. 
 113 See supra notes 52–59 and accompanying text. 
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V. LAW IN THE HOLMES SCHOOL 
So if law were to be considered “law in fact,” what would law school 
look like? It would largely entail examining the experience of litigants who 
are represented, litigants who are not represented, and litigants who are rep-
resented but have lawyers with overwhelming caseloads, who are poorly 
prepared, or who are just not very good. If law schools studied “law in 
fact,” they would undertake to understand how many claims are not claimed 
because the claimants do not have the knowledge or resources to claim 
them.114 The study of “law in fact” would also examine geographic differ-
ences among urban and rural courts, differences based on “jurisdiction”—
such as among federal courts, state courts, family courts, small claims 
courts, and “rent courts,” differences among governmental yet non-judicial 
fora such as administrative tribunals, and differences among extra-judicial 
or non-judicial processes such as arbitration and mediation. It would com-
pare appellate courts with trial courts. More generally, the study of “law in 
fact” would look at the law’s impact or non-impact on actual human beings. 
By jettisoning traditional law school pedagogy, the Holmes School 
takes Holmes’s dangerous idea to its logical conclusion which, in turn, leads 
to what Daniel Dennett has called, in a different context, “universal acid:” 
Universal acid is a liquid so corrosive that it will eat through any-
thing! . . . . It dissolves glass bottles and stainless-steel canisters 
as readily as paper bags. What would happen if you somehow 
came upon or created a dollop of universal acid? Would the whole 
planet eventually be destroyed? What would it leave in its wake? 
. . . . [I]t eats through just about every traditional concept, and 
leaves in its wake a revolutionized world-view, with most of the 
old landmarks still recognizable, but transformed in fundamental 
ways.115 
Holmes’s “universal acid” would, if applied or even taken seriously, 
“eat through” settled notions of “law.” Holmes’s dangerous idea is more 
than a “paradigm shift.”116 It does not shift traditional legal tenets; it elimi-
nates them. The Holmes School insists on studying “law in context.” Given 
                                                                                                                           
 114 See supra note 110 and accompanying text.  
 115 Dennett, supra note 49, at 63. Holmes employed a related metaphor—“cynical acid”—to 
refer to the impact of his ideas. See Holmes, supra note 12, at 461–62. “Universal acid” more 
accurately captures Holmes’s ideas, however, because (to continue the metaphor) it corrodes 
through everything. Felix Cohen, however, referred to “cynical acid” as “Holmes’ suggestive 
phrase.” Cohen, supra note 34, at 830. 
 116 See THOMAS S. KUHN, 2 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF UNIFIED SCIENCE, THE 
STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 42–51, (1970) (introducing the concept of a paradigm 
shift). 
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that every context is unique, and that context only resides in fluidity and 
messiness, there is never a point of rest; no set of bedrock principles are 
transferable across contexts. 
A rare example of a realist who accepted the challenge of implement-
ing this worldview was Felix Cohen in Transcendental Nonsense and the 
Functional Approach.117 Cohen does take Holmes seriously, noting that 
Holmes offered a “basis for the redefinition of every legal concept . . . .”118 
Cohen undertook to see, learn about, and teach law through a Holmesian 
lens. He defined jurisprudence as a study of human behavior.”119 According 
to Cohen, 
Law is a social process, a complex of human activities, and an 
adequate legal science must deal with human activity, with cause 
and effect, with the past and the future . . . . Legal systems, prin-
ciples, rules, institutions, concepts, and decisions can be under-
stood only as functions of human behavior.120 
Cohen, however, continued to grasp at the rational and the systematic. At-
tempting to gain traction in a Holmesian world, Cohen summoned the sci-
entific method in the context of the social sciences of sociology, economics, 
and psychology.121 He sought to maintain the legitimacy of law through 
science, albeit with a Holmesian twist. 
Although Cohen’s efforts are valiant, his method fails because, as An-
thony Amsterdam has noted, “no system of concepts . . . are as numerous, 
variegated, and nuanced as the circumstances which bring the system into 
play.”122 Cohen thus falls into the trap of imposing a system through science 
that shapes and defines what “law” is, and, in so doing, loses its focus on 
reality. Cohen replaces one set of “simplifications” with another.123 In Co-
hen’s conception, the “universal acid” is not universal after all. 
                                                                                                                           
 117 See Cohen, supra note 34, at 821–22. 
 118 Id. at 828. 
 119 Id. at 845. 
 120 Id. at 844–45. 
 121 Id. at 821, 824, 830. 
 122 Letter from Anthony G. Amsterdam to author (October 20, 1996) (on file with the author). 
For a perceptive interdisciplinary study that explores how “ordering systems” recreate the world in 
their own image, see generally JAMES C. SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE: HOW CERTAIN SCHEMES 
TO IMPROVE THE HUMAN CONDITION HAVE FAILED (1998). 
 123 Stanley Fish similarly challenged the idea of “critical self-consciousness”—the notion that 
critical theory reaches a “real” perspective that succeeds (to some degree) in capturing “reality.” 
STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE PRACTICE OF 
THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES 436–57 (1989). Fish notes that all “perspectives”—
including “critical” ones—are never as nuanced as the circumstances that bring them into play. Id. 
at 436. 
2015] Holmes School: Reforming Legal Education Through Realism 55 
In contrast, the Holmes School curriculum and pedagogy does not as-
pire to be particularly scientific or systematic. It requires the minimization 
of “concepts” and systematic ways of thinking that shape and mislead. Ra-
ther, the signature pedagogy of the Holmes School is experiential. It en-
courages lawyers and law students to go and see places, to grapple with 
context, confront and recognize contradictions. It promotes “get[ting] 
somewhere with the matter at hand” by suspecting that “you are not quite 
getting it right.”124 It means going to Lawrence, Massachusetts to see how 
things really are.125 
So how to get students to Lawrence, Massachusetts? By going there, of 
course. Going there, however, can happen in many ways. It can be going 
someplace physically. It can be going someplace through narratives, espe-
cially from people who have experienced the place.126 It can also be going 
someplace through art—visual, written, or oral. “Going” implies a move-
ment unmediated by “law” in order to see what law really means in context. 
VI. LIKELY OBJECTIONS AND RESPONSES 
No doubt many would disagree with the principles of the Holmes 
School. The following anticipates two of the foreseeable objections, with 
responses. 
For some critics, the Proposal merely seeks to indoctrinate students to 
a leftist agenda that is anathema to a neutral institution of higher learning. 
They would argue that the name of the school should really be the “Marx 
School for Undermining the Free Market for Legal Services and Indoctri-
nating Students in So-Called ‘Social Justice,’ which Is Really Code for So-
cialism.” 
This argument, however, misses the point. The principles forming the 
basis of the Proposed Holmes School are descriptive. The extensive foot-
notes that accompany much of this Proposal, especially the course descrip-
tions, merely describe what law is to the vast majority of Americans.127 In-
deed, it is the “conventional” law school curriculum that embodies funda-
mental political and ideological premises. First year classes omit any refer-
ence to what the vast majority of Americans experience as law, which re-
veals law schools’ assumptions concerning what is or is not worth know-
                                                                                                                           
 124 See CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 29 (1973). 
 125 See supra notes 73–74 and accompanying text. 
 126 See Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Norms and Narratives: Can Judges Avoid Serious 
Moral Error?, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1929, 1931, 1934 (1991) (arguing that judges should consider 
narratives written by and about members of oppressed and marginalized groups in order to more 
deeply understand their lives). 
 127 It is worth noting that the Proposal does not cite Karl Marx. 
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ing.128 Its premises, however, are masked by a veneer of “rigor,” “logic,” 
and “thinking like a lawyer,” which effectively keeps its biases well hidden. 
Further, Holmes—the school’s namesake and originator of many of its 
premises—was no radical. To the contrary, he evidenced “hostility to most 
social reform . . . .”129 His greatest enthusiasm for a particular social policy 
was for eugenics—the forced sterilization of, as he put it, degenerates and 
imbeciles.130 While Holmes’s appalling view of Social Darwinism is happi-
ly beyond the pale for virtually everyone, judges identified as “conserva-
tives” would nevertheless find many things to like in the curriculum of the 
Holmes School.131 
Finally, the rhetoric of the profession has acknowledged and excoriated 
time and time again the profound deficiencies in the average citizen’s access 
to justice.132 This endless repetition, despite sounding grand, has had perni-
cious consequences; it has transformed an immediate crisis into an ongoing 
“problem” calling for an eventual solution. This is a crisis, however, that vio-
lates or, at best, risks basic human rights to subsistence, shelter, and raising 
children.133 The Holmes School reintroduces the centrality and immediacy of 
this crisis that individuals of all political stripes recognize exists. 
                                                                                                                           
 128 See Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education as Training for Hierarchy, in THE POLITICS OF 
LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 54, 55–58 (David Kairys ed., 1998). 
 129 Posner, supra note 53, at xxviii. 
 130 See Buck v. Bell, 264 U.S. 200, 207 (1927). The case includes Holmes’s infamous praise 
of the eugenics movement: 
It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for 
crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are 
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vaccination is broad enough to cover cutting the Fallopian tubes. Three generations 
of imbeciles are enough. 
Id. 
 131 Consider Judge Alex Kozinski, whose ideas have been cited previously in this article. See 
supra note 20 and accompanying text. Similarly, Richard Posner’s conceptions of “pragmatism” 
reflect a great deal of the core of the Holmes School curriculum. See Posner, supra note 67, at 
240. Judge Posner has advocated for viewing the “facts” of legal formalism much more broadly to 
include social science. See id. For example, in considering the “enforceability of contracts of sur-
rogate motherhood,” Posner would consider the degree to which surrogate mothers “experience 
intense regret” and “whether contracts of surrogate motherhood are typically or frequently ex-
ploitive in the sense that the surrogate mother is a poor woman who enters into the contract out of 
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 132 See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
 133 See AUERBACH, supra note 36, at 143–44. Sadly almost a century ago, one commentator 
noted “the righteous complaint that the liberty and rights of the mass of the people are now 
crushed and lost beneath the weight of the system.” Rowe, supra note 96, at 592; see also Derek 
C. Bok, A Flawed System of Law Practice and Training, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 570, 574 (1983) 
(noting that “[t]he blunt, inexcusable fact . . . that this nation . . . cannot manage to protect the 
rights of most of its citizens” “has become so familiar that it evokes little concern from most of 
those who spend their lives in the profession”). 
2015] Holmes School: Reforming Legal Education Through Realism 57 
Second, critics will argue that the Proposal is “holier than thou.” This 
may be a fair critique. The Proposal however, is certainly no holier than tradi-
tional references to the “High Court,” “sanctity” of law, and “prayer for re-
lief.”134 
CONCLUSION 
This Proposal makes sober good sense and offers as close a reflection 
of the world of law as it is, and, sadly, how it will likely be in the future. For 
this reason, it will never fully see the light of day. Even if not, however, it 
reflects the reality of law. Surely the reality of law has a place in legal edu-
cation, even if it is only a single trip to Lawrence, Massachusetts.
                                                                                                                           
 134 See AUERBACH, supra note 36, at 142–43 (discussing the legal system’s embrace of ma-
jestic symbolism to promote its own legitimacy). 
   
 
